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You must remember this
A kiss is still a kiss, a sigh is just a sigh
The fundamental things apply
1
As time goes by

As Time Goes By is Becca’s favorite song this week, and she is
2
wondering what it would take to broadcast the song for her 1,000
closest friends. The legal answer of course is “it depends”; it depends
on the choices she makes. To find out “what it would take,” she must
figure out what version of the song As Time Goes By to broadcast, to
3
whom the copyright belongs, and how she wants to broadcast it.
The words and the musical score, known as the musical
composition, were written by Herman Hupfield and are not part of
4
the public domain. Therefore, the musical composition copyright
owner has the right to be compensated. And depending on how Becca
wants to broadcast the song, she may also have to compensate the
owner of a particular sound recorded version. Each recorded version
of the song also has a copyright, known as the sound recording, which
is a separate copyright from the musical composition. Whether it’s
Frank Sinatra’s, Ella Fitzgerald’s, Billie Holiday’s, Harry Nilsson’s or
Bryan Ferry’s version, each sound recording copyright may belong to
5
someone different. Becca has decided that she’s partial to the Billie
Holiday version; now she must decide how she wants to publicly
perform the song.
Becca’s decision on how to broadcast the song will have other
implications. If she sends the song via a traditional, over-the-air,
terrestrial broadcast, copyright law provides that she is only
responsible for compensating the copyright owner of the musical
6
composition, and not the copyright owner of the sound recording.
However, radio broadcast licenses are limited in number and
1. Herman Hupfield, As Time Goes By (Harms, Inc., New York 1931).
2. In this section, the term “broadcast” is used colloquially to mean publicly perform
or announce to the public. The term is not employed as it is defined in the Copyright Act,
“a transmission made by a terrestrial broadcast station licensed as such by the Federal
Communications Commission.” 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(3) (2004).
3. See explanation of copyright law infra Part II.
4. No permission is needed to use a musical composition that is in the public
domain. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 26 (3rd ed. 2002).
5. See id. at 15 (noting that finding out who controls the rights to a song and with
whom to deal to obtain permission to broadcast the song “is not as easy a question to
answer as you might expect”).
6. See infra text and accompanying notes 35-39.
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regulated by the Federal Communications Commission.7 As a private
individual without a license, it is unrealistic for Becca to broadcast the
song over terrestrial radio.
Recognizing this, she turns her attention to her desktop
8
computer and considers webcasting the song over the Internet. She
soon discovers that webcasters, unlike terrestrial broadcasters, are not
exempt from royalty payments to the copyright holder of a sound
recording. Terrestrial broadcasters are only responsible for
compensating the copyright owner of the musical composition,
however webcasters must compensate both copyright owner of the
musical composition and the copyright owner of the sound recording.
Becca also learns that not only will she have to pay for the musical
composition and the sound recording (and who knows how much that
9
will be), but she also has to comply with something called a “sound
10
recording performance complement.”
The sound recording performance complement limits the
number of songs that may be played during a three-hour period to no
more than three songs from one album, but no more than two songs
11
back to back. To qualify for a “statutory license,” which enables her
to webcast any song she likes without having to first negotiate price
7. See generally About the FCC, Federal Communications Commission, at
http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
8. See explanation, infra Part I. See also Walter S. Mossberg, Getting to Know the
ABCs of the WWW to Dazzle Friends, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1996, at B1 (answering
common questions about World Wide Web).
9. Librarian of Congress James Billington adopted a flat royalty rate of 0.07¢ per
song performed, per listener for all Internet transmissions. Determination of Reasonable
Rates and Terms for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral
Recordings, 67 Fed. Reg. 45239, 45272 (June 20, 2002) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261),
available at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/webcast_regs.html (July 8, 2002). However, the
Small Webcaster Settlement Act (SWSA), signed by President George W. Bush on
December 4, 2002, temporarily suspended the obligation of small commercial webcasters
to pay statutory royalties and allowed the recording industry and small webcasters,
including non-commercial webcasters, to agree to more reasonable retroactive royalty
fees. Pursuant to the SWSA, SoundExchange, the music industry’s principal royalty
collector, and a group of webcasters negotiated a royalty agreement to pay negotiated fees
instead of the fees determined by the Library of Congress. Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat.
2780 (2002) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 112, 114). See also Notification of Agreement Under
the Small Webcaster Settlement Act of 2002, 67 Fed. Reg. 78510 (Dec. 24, 2002). Nearly a
year after the SWSA was passed, small webcasters were still unhappy with the fee
schedule. Webcaster Alliance, a group of several hundred small commercial webcasters,
filed an antitrust suit against the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) and
the big five record labels, alleging that the royalty rates for small webcasters set up in
December 2002 were designed to drive the smaller of the small web radio stations out of
business. Webcaster Alliance Sues RIAA, Labels, THE ONLINE REPORTER, Aug. 30, 2003.
10. See infra text and accompanying notes 64-66.
11. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(13) (2004).
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and permission with each copyright owner—so long as she pays the
12
royalty fee —Becca must comply with the sound recording
performance complement and limit the number of songs she plays
during any three-hour period. Becca is distressed to learn that she is
not only responsible for paying a royalty fee for the musical
composition and the sound recording, but she is also limited in the
number of songs she can webcast. Terrestrial broadcasters are
responsible for paying a royalty fee for the musical composition,
however webcasters are additionally responsible for the sound
recording royalty fee and complying with the SRPC.
Becca wonders why her freedom of expression in the form and
quantity of music she wishes to play is so highly restricted when she is
already obligated to compensate the copyright owner for the privilege
of playing the music. So long as she is paying the prescribed royalty
fee, Becca wants to know why she cannot play as many Billie Holiday
songs as she likes in a row. Terrestrial broadcasters do it all the time.
Becca believes this is not right; she believes this is not fair; she begins
to wonder if it is Constitutional.
This article explores Becca’s question whether the statutory
license, prescribed by federal copyright law, for webcasters to
transmit sound recordings violates the First Amendment. Part I
briefly explores webcasting and how the technology works. Part II
explains the copyright law as it relates to music, including the Digital
13
Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 and the Digital
14
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998. Part III reviews articles by
prominent legal scholars that suggest First Amendment scrutiny
should apply to copyright laws and the Supreme Court’s media
specific First Amendment analyses. And Part IV discusses why the
sound recording complement may not pass judicial review and
therefore could be struck down. Part V concludes with another look
at Becca and her webcasting options.

12. See KOHN, supra note 4, at 421 (explaining that “[B]y properly following the
procedure and paying the statutory rate set forth in the compulsory license provision, a
person seeking to clear permission will be assured a license without taking any risk of
liability for copyright infringement.”).
13. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (1995) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
14. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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I. Webcasting and How it Works
Sue Cummings, a writer for the New York Times, notes, “Internet
radio is no longer an online version of what Web-types like to call
terrestrial radio. It’s live game-playing, it’s community, it’s chat, it’s
15
TV, and it’s as many channels as a site has servers.” While a typical
American city has twenty to fifty broadcast radio stations, online
16
listeners can access more than 13,000 sites. Because the Internet is
relatively unbounded, the electromagnetic spectrum limitations that
constrain terrestrial broadcasters do not apply to webcasters. Unlike
terrestrial radio, Web radio is not a scarce medium regulated by the
17
government.
To understand Web radio it is helpful to understand the Web
generally. Typical surfing on the Web relies on a “pull” method of
transferring Web pages, where a Web page is not accessed or
18
delivered until a browser requests it. Webcasting, on the other hand,
19
uses “push” technology. In the case of webcasting, it means that the
songs are sent out over the Internet, even if no one is listening or
requesting the song. E-mail is another form of push technology. You
receive e-mail messages whether you asked for them or not, because
20
the sender pushes the mail to you.
Similarly, “streaming” transfers data so that it can be processed
as a steady and continuous stream. Music sent in this format is not
designed to be permanently stored on a user’s computer, but rather
21
enjoyed for the moment like terrestrial radio. An advantage of using
streaming technology is that a user can start hearing the song before

15. Sue Cummings, Internet Radio Offers a Wide Choice to a Slim Audience, N.Y.
TIMES, October 25, 2000, at 35.
16. Id.
17. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969) (observing that
“if there is to be any effective communication by radio, only a few can be licensed and the
rest must be barred from the airwaves”).
18. Pull, WEBOPEDIA.COM, at http://www.Webopedia.com/TERM/p/pull.html (last
modified March 12, 2002).
19. Webcasting,
WEBOPEDIA.COM,
at
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/w/
webcasting.html (last modified May 19, 1998).
20. Push, WEBOPEDIA.COM, at http://www.Webopedia.com/TERM/P/push.html (last
modified October 16, 2002).
21. Streaming allows a user to play music files directly over the Web without having
to download the file in its entirety before playing it. MP3, WEBOPEDIA.COM, at
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/M/MP3.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). See also KOHN,
supra note 4, at 1258 (noting that streaming transmissions constitute merely a performance
and no copy if made during the transmission, whereas in download transmissions there is a
reproduction of the work in the form of a new copy).
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the entire digital file is transmitted.22 For streaming to work, a user’s
computer collects data as a steady stream so digital packets can be
processed into sound or pictures. In other words, if the user receives
the data more quickly than needed, the computer must save the
excess data in a buffer. But if the data does not come quickly enough,
23
then the data display will not be smooth. The speed of data display is
largely dependent on bandwidth and file size.
Decreasing the file size facilitates a more rapid transfer of data,
which in turn helps create a smooth stream of music. To decrease the
24
file size music files are compressed into MP3 format. Superfluous
information from the original music file is filtering out, generally with
25
minimal loss in quality. The quality of an MP3 file ultimately
26
depends on the bit rate at which the file is recorded. A file recorded
at 128 kbps will sound like a CD track, however, a file recorded at 16
27
kbps may only sound like AM radio. The inherent trade-off in
recording MP3s is that to achieve better sound quality the file size will
be larger and may be slower in streaming. Original music files
compressed in MP3 are still protected by copyright law.

II. Copyright for Music
Copyright protects an original work of authorship, including
music, fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which it can be
28
heard and reproduced. Copyright attaches at the moment a song is
recorded, giving the copyright owner a bundle of legal rights. Music
22. Streaming, WEBOPEDIA.COM, at http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/streaming.
html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). See also Matt Jackson, From Broadcast to Webcast:
Copyright Law and Streaming Media, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 447, 450-52 (2003)
(describing streaming technology as it relates to webcasting).
23. Streaming, WEBOPEDIA.COM, at http://www.Webopedia.com/TERM/s/streaming.
html (last modified March 28, 2002).
24. MP3 is an abbreviation for Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) 1 Audio
Layer 3, and it is the latest of three progressively more advanced coding schemes that use
entropy encoding to reduce to a minimum the number of redundant sounds in audio and
video files. See The Reference Website for MPEG!, MPEG.ORG, at
http://www.mpeg.org/MPEG/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2004). An MP3 file can be up to eleven
times smaller than an original raw data file. KOHN, supra note 4, at 1269. See also, Mark
Adler & Harald Popp, Introduction to MPEG, at http://www.faqs.org/faqs/compressionfaq/part2/section-2.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
25. See The Reference Website for MPEG!, MPEG.ORG, at http://www.mpeg.org/
MPEG/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2004).
26. See User Guide: Create MP3, mp3PRO, WAV or WMA files, MUSICMATCH.ORG,
at http://www.musicmatch.com/info/user_guide/rip_record.htm#defaultbitrate (last visited
Feb. 3, 2004).
27. Id.
28. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2004).
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does not need to be registered to receive protection since a copyright
29
attaches at the moment of creation; however, registration is
generally required before filing suit for infringement and is necessary
30
to receive statutory damages. Music is unique because it embodies
two distinct copyrights. There is a copyright in the underlying musical
notes and lyrics, which is separate from the copyright in each sound
recorded version of a song.
A copyright in the musical notes and accompanying lyrics is
31
called the “musical composition.” The composer and lyricist both
32
hold the copyright for the musical composition. From the moment of
creation, the composer and lyricist co-own an undivided interest in
the song. The co-owners of the copyright are analogous to tenants in
common of real property insofar as each owner has an undivided
33
ownership interest in the entire work. On the other hand, the “sound
recording” copyright subsists in the actual fixation or recording of the
34
sounds. The performer, whose performance is fixed, or the record
producer, who processes the sounds and then fixes them, or both are
35
the authors of this work. As explained in detail in a later section, to
webcast a song, Becca would need permission from both the musical
composition copyright holder and the sound recording copyright
holder. But to sing her own version of As Time Goes By, Becca would
need permission only from the musical composition copyright holder.
The legal rights of a copyright owner include the exclusive right
(1) to reproduce, (2) to prepare derivative works, (3) to distribute
copies to the public, (4) to perform the work publicly, (5) to display
the work publicly, and in the case of sound recordings, (6) to perform
36
the work publicly via digital audio transmission. The first five rights
are the bundle of rights that all musical composition copyright owners

29. See id.
30. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 411 and 412 (2004).
31. Library of Congress, Copyright Registration of Musical Compositions and Sound
Recordings, U.S. Copyright Office, at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56a.pdf (updated
October 2, 2002) [hereinafter Musical Compositions and Sound Recordings].
32. Id.
33. KOHN, supra note 4, at 407.
34. “Sound recordings” are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical,
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or
other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks,
tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004).
35. See Musical Compositions and Sound Recordings, supra note 31.
36. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2004). See KOHN, supra note 4, at 1258 (explaining that the
term digital transmission “accurately describes the delivery of musical works and sound
recordings that do not involve the transfer of possession of physical objects”).
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enjoy. The sixth right applies only to copyright owners of sound
recordings.
Section 106(4) of the Copyright Act grants the copyright owner
of the musical composition the exclusive right to “perform the
37
copyrighted work publicly,” such as to play a song over the radio.
Therefore, the copyright owner of the musical composition has the
exclusive right to authorize a radio station to broadcast a song over
38
the airwaves. Because a copyright owner has the right to exclude
others, she can charge a license fee to allow others to publicly
perform the work. Radio stations, therefore, pay the copyright owner
39
a fee for the right to broadcast the song. However, Section 106(4)
does not extend the exclusive performance right in sound recordings
40
to terrestrial radio or television. A radio station that broadcasts a
song must pay the copyright owner for the musical composition, but
41
does not pay the copyright owner of the sound recording. An
upcoming section further explains how webcasters are treated
differently from terrestrial broadcasters.
A. Recent Statutory Changes to Copyright Law

Recent federal legislation has changed the landscape of
copyright law. Before 1972, federal copyright law did not protect
42
sound recordings. Generally, such recordings were protected by
43
common law or in some cases by statutes enacted in certain states.
The copyright law was amended to protect sound recordings fixed
and first published with the statutory copyright notice on or after
44
45
February 15, 1972. Four years later, in the Copyright Act of 1976,

37. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2004).
38. The Copyright Act includes play, render and recite in the definition of perform.
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2004). The public performance right in §106(4) does not extend to
private performances of a song at home.
39. The royalties for musical works are collected and administered by three major
performing rights societies: the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI), and Society of European Stage Actors and
Composers (SESAC).
40. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(a) (2004) (“The exclusive rights of the owner of a copyright in
a sound recording . . . do not include any right of performance under section 106(4).”)
41. See KOHN, supra note 4, at 1314 (explaining that “the right of public performance
under U.S. copyright law only applies to songs, not to sound recordings”) (emphasis in
original).
42. Library of Congress, Copyright Registration for Sound Recordings, U.S.
Copyright Office, at http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ56.html (April 21, 2002)
[hereinafter Sound Recordings].
43. Id.
44. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
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federal protection was further extended to published and unpublished
sound recordings fixed on or after February 15, 1972, irrespective of
46
the copyright notice. In the 1990’s Congress passed two more major
copyright bills. The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
47
48
Act (DPRSA) and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)
49
changed copyright law, especially for webcasters. An examination of
the copyright laws that apply to webcasters set the stage for the
constitutional challenge outlined below.
1.

Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995

The DPRSA, effective February 1, 1996, created a new limited
performance right for certain digital (but not analog) transmissions of
50
sound recordings. It added Section 106(6), which granted copyright
owners of sound recordings the exclusive right to “perform the
51
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.”
In other words, the owner of a sound recording is now entitled to
royalties for public performances of a song via “digital audio
transmissions,” but not for public performances over terrestrial radio
that use analog transmissions. This new digital performance right in
52
sound recordings applied to “interactive” (on demand music) and

45. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
46. Sound Recordings, supra note 42.
47. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (1995) [hereinafter DPRSA]. The copyright owner’s interest in the public
performance rights of the sound recording is protected by the DPRSA, whereas the
musical composition, song lyrics for example, is protected by the Sound Recording Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391.
48. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
[hereinafter DMCA]. The DMCA added §§ 512 and 1201-05 to the Copyright Act of 1976.
In 1998, the U.S. acceded to the WIPO Copyright Treaty [hereinafter WCT] and the
WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty [hereinafter WPPT]. The DMCA
implements the obligations set forth in articles 11 and 12 of the WCT and articles 18 and
19 of the WPPT, to protect against the circumvention of effective technological measures,
and to protect “rights management information” against removal or alteration of
identifying information that facilitates infringement.
49. See KOHN, supra note 4, at 1256 (noting that the DPRSA and the DMCA are
“two important pieces of legislation bearing upon the subject of digital transmissions of
music”). The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998), is another major copyright bill enacted in the 1990’s. However, a detailed
treatment of this law is outside the scope of this article. For more information see
generally Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (upholding Congress’s extension of the
terms of all copyrights).
50. Sound Recordings, supra note 42. See also 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114 (2004).
51. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2004).
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j) (7) (2004).
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“subscription”53 (fee for service music) transmissions because they
54
had the potential to “adversely affect sales of sound recordings.”
55
“Nonsubscription transmissions,” such as those sent by
webcasters, were not subject to the expanded sound recording
copyrights created by DPRSA. As Jane C. Ginsburg, professor of law
at Columbia University explains, “[t]he digital transmissions reached
by the 1995 expansion of the sound recording copyright turn out to
have omitted a principal form of Internet exploitation of sound
recordings: audio ‘streaming’ or ‘webcasting’ of recorded
56
performances.” Like terrestrial broadcasters, under the DPRSA
webcasters only paid a license for the musical composition, and not
57
for the sound recording. “In what appeared to be a major blunder by
the recording industry, authors of the [DPRSA] appear to have
assumed that webcasting, or the broadcasting of digital radio stations
over the Web, would be primarily supported by subscription fees,”
58
whereas it turned out to be primarily supported by advertising.
Therefore, the owners of sound recordings lobbied for more
legislation, which they got in the DMCA.
2.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act

The webcaster lacuna in the DPRSA was filled by the DMCA.59
A last-minute addition to the DMCA inserted extremely detailed
provisions that eliminated the webcaster exemption from paying

53. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j) (14) (2004).
54. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, S. Rep. No. 104-128,
at 15 (Aug. 4, 1995) [hereinafter Senate Report] (explaining that “[t]his legislation is a
narrowly crafted response to one of the concerns expressed by representatives of the
music community, namely that certain types of subscription and interactive audio services
might adversely affect sales of sound recordings and erode copyright owners’ ability to
control and be paid for use of their work. Subscription and interactive audio services can
provide multichannel offerings of various music formats in CD-quality recordings,
commercial free and 24 hours a day.”).
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(j) (9) (2004).
56. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislation for the “Digital Millennium,” 23
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 167 (1999).
57. See id. at 167-68.
58. KOHN, supra note 4, at 1299-1300.
59. A complimentary issue revolves around the question of “ephemeral copies” used
to facilitate sound recording transmission. 17 U.S.C. § 112(e) provides for another
statutory license to make ephemeral recordings that facilitate transmission of sound
recordings. The Librarian of Congress set the ephemeral license fee for webcasters at 8.8
percent of the performance fees due. See Determination of Reasonable Rates and Terms
for the Digital Performance of Sound Recordings and Ephemeral Recordings, 67 Fed.
Reg. 45239, 45272 (June 20, 2002) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 261), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/carp/Webcast_regs.html (July 8, 2002).
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license fees to copyright owners of sound recordings.60 Webcasters
now were required to pay license fees to copyright owners of sound
recordings. To avoid having to negotiate price and permission to
transmit songs, the 1998 webcaster amendments included a provision
for a statutory license to both subscription and nonsubscription digital
transmissions that conformed to “exceedingly detailed eligibility
61
requirements.” The new statutory license applied to “eligible
nonsubscription transmission,” which included webcasters’ non62
interactive sound recording transmissions.
In sum, webcasters were exempt before the DMCA. After the
DMCA, to qualify for the statutory license whereby the copyright
owners of sound recordings could not deny permission or charge a
license fee greater that the statutory rate, webcasters had to conform
their transmissions to detailed eligibility requirements. Qualifying for
the statutory license means that an owner of sound recording
copyright cannot refuse permission to webcast a recording and cannot
charge a license fee greater than the fee established by a Copyright
63
Arbitration Royalty Panel. So long as a transmission qualifies for a
statutory license, the copyright owner of a sound recording does not
have the right to exclude another from transmitting the song.
Transmissions ineligible for the statutory license are subject to
the sound recording copyright owner’s full public performance right.
This includes the right to prohibit the broadcast or charge whatever
64
fee the market will allow. To be eligible for the statutory license, the
webcaster’s transmissions, among other things, must be noninteractive, the primary purpose must be to provide audio or other
entertainment programming to the public, and the webcaster must
conform the transmissions to the sound recording performance
65
complement.

60. See KOHN, supra note 4, at 1336-37. See also Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 166.
61. Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 168-69. The 1998 amendments did not extend to
interactive digital transmissions and therefore owners of sound recordings, who have the
exclusive right to license digital audio transmissions, have exclusive control to determine
price and permission for such transmissions.
62. 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) & (f)(2) (2004).
63. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2004). See also Karen Fessler, Note, Webcasting:
Webcasting Royalty Rates, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 399, 407-11 (2003) (discussing the
failed attempt at industry negotiated royalty rates and the CARP recommendation,
subject to review by the Librarian of Congress).
64. See Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 169.
65. See 17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2) (2004). This section also outlines several other criteria
for eligibility that are not pertinent to the focus of this article.
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The “sound recording performance complement” is defined as
the transmission during any three-hour period of no more than three
different songs from any one album, if no more than two selections
are transmitted consecutively. It is also defined as a selection of four
different songs by the same recording artist or from any box set or
compilation, if no more than three songs are transmitted
66
consecutively during any three-hour period. Basically, more than
three songs by an artist in three hours makes the transmission
ineligible for the statutory license. A transmission ineligible for a
statutory license means that the copyright owner of the sound
recording can charge whatever license fee she likes or even deny
67
permission to transmit all together.
What was a nonexistent right until 1972, turned into a narrow
right under the DPRSA, and now offers only a narrow exception to
terrestrial broadcasters. Per the DMCA amendments, only a
“nonsubscription broadcast transmission,” defined as a transmission
made by a terrestrial broadcast station licensed by the FCC, is exempt
from the statutory license fee and sound recording complement
68
restriction. Under the DPRSA, only interactive transmissions where
users could access songs on demand and subscription transmissions
were subject to the royalty fee, but now under the DMCA only
traditional radio stations are exempt. The DMCA flipped the narrow
sound recording right provided by the DPRSA into a narrow
exception for traditional, terrestrial broadcasters. To illustrate how
narrow the exception is for terrestrial broadcasters, it does not apply
to songs simulcast over the Web. Radio stations that simulcast over
69
the Web are also subject to the sound recording copyright fee. The
rationale for broadening the scope of protection for sound recordings
was premised on a fear that if consumers could access the songs they
66. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(13) (2004). There is also a good-faith-type clause that provides
if the transmission exceeds the numerical limits from multiple phonorecords, it
nonetheless qualifies as a sound recording performance complement if the programming
of the multiple phonorecords was not willfully intended to avoid the numerical limitations.
Id.
67. If you are a bit turned around, you are in good company as David Nimmer, a
prominent copyright scholar, described the resulting framework from the 1995 and 1998
amendments to be nothing short of “frightfully complex.” David Nimmer, Ignoring the
Public, Part I: On the Absurd Complexity of the Digital Audio Transmission Right, 7
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189, 191 (2000).
68. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 114(d)(1)(A) & (j)(3) (2004).
69. AM and FM radio stations that simulcast transmissions over the Internet are not
exempt “nonsubscription broadcast transmission,” and therefore must pay the public
performance royalty fee. See Bonneville Int’l Corp. v. Peters, 153 F. Supp. 2d 763, 771
(E.D. Pa. 2001).
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want on demand then this would undermine the sound recording
owner’s revenue from record sales.
B.

Legislative History for Recent Copyright Law Changes

In the DPRSA Senate Report of 1995, the Committee on the
Judiciary explained that it intended “to provide copyright holders of
sound recordings with the ability to control the distribution of their
product by digital transmissions, without hampering the arrival of
70
new technologies . . . .” The report also showed the Committee’s
mindfulness of the need to strike a balance among all of the interests
affected. The Committee was concerned that granting too broad of a
performance right in sound recordings “would make it economically
infeasible for some transmitters to continue certain current uses of
71
sound recordings.” According to the legislative history, this concern
72
was accommodated by various limitations on the exclusive right. The
statutory license is such a limitation on the exclusive right.
As previously discussed, the DMCA deleted the exemption for
73
webcasters. A House of Representatives Report explained that the
1998 amendments were intended to achieve two purposes. First, to
further Congress’s objective when it passed the DPRSA in 1995 to
ensure recording artists and record companies would be protected as
74
new technologies affect the ways that their creative works were used.
And second, “to create fair and efficient licensing mechanisms that
address[ed] the complex issues facing copyright owners and copyright
75
users as a result of the rapid growth of digital audio services.”

70. Senate Report, supra note 54, at 15. Interactive transmissions were seen as the
biggest threat to owners of sound recordings:
Of all the new forms of digital transmission services, interactive services are most
likely to have a significant impact on traditional record sales, and therefore pose
the greatest threat to the livelihoods of those whose income depends upon
revenues derived from traditional record sales. The Committee believes that
sound recording copyright owners should have the exclusive right to control the
performance of their works as part of an interactive service, and so has excluded
interactive services from these limitations on the performance right.
Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. For a thorough examination of the legislative history of the DMCA, see generally
David Nimmer, Appreciating Legislative History: The Sweet and Sour Spots of the
DMCA’s Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (2002).
74. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 79 (October 8,
1998).
75. Id. at 79-80.
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Whether these are the true motivating factors for Congress is
open to speculation. Neil Netanel, professor of law at University of
Texas, casts doubt on the reliability of these pronouncements because
76
of the high level of industry involvement in lobbying for this
77
legislation. He noted, “especially given the DMCA’s unprecedented
expansion of content provider rights and industry’s hand in drafting
the Act’s legislative history, that statement of legislative purpose
78
ought not be taken at face value.” Other commentators have also
suggested that Congress may not have fully considered competing
interests affected by the DMCA beyond the powerful lobbying
79
organizations before them.
Prior to the DPRSA and DMCA, sound recording artists and
producers were compensated only from sales of records. Radio
broadcasts advertised the recordings, thereby stimulating record
80
sales. In the digital environment, however, some argue that
webcasting may not serve the same function of stimulating sales of
tangible copies. Professor Ginsburg noted, “[t]he more easy it
becomes to access and experience works of authorship by means of
digital transmission, the less necessary, and perhaps also the less
81
desirable, it becomes to possess retention copies.” This may have
been just the scenario that prompted some in Congress to afford
greater protection for copyright owners of sound recordings.
However, the question remains whether the method of providing such
protection is constitutional, irrespective of the laudable intent.

III. First Amendment Scrutiny & Copyright
A. Applying First Amendment Scrutiny to Copyright Law

Copyright has been generally immunized from First Amendment
scrutiny, however Professor Netanel argues that not only have courts
consistently gotten it wrong, but that “copyright’s judicial exoneration

76. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, Congress received $15.5 million
in 2000 from the entertainment industry to crack down on copyright infringement on the
Internet. See Holly Bailey, Land of the MP3: A Look at Hollywood’s Lobbying on Napster
& Copyright Issues, Opensecrets.org, June 12, 2000, at http://www.opensecrets.org/
alerts/v5/alertv5_48.asp.
77. Neil W. Netanel, Locating Copyright within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 78 (2001).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 4, at 1337.
80. Ginsburg, supra note 56, at 170.
81. Id.
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seems to rest largely on historical accident.”82 The historical accident
to which he refers is the courts reliance on Professor Melville
Nimmer’s 1970 law review article wherein he concludes that copyright
83
law posed no First Amendment conflict. Nimmer reasoned that the
First Amendment protects the dissemination of ideas—not any
particular form of the idea, and copyright protects the form of the
expression—not the underlying ideas, therefore it is likely that other
84
words are available to express the same idea.
Today’s copyright law looks very different from the 1970’s
version Professor Nimmer was writing about. Professor Netanel
explains the current “copyright law’s primary internal safety valves—
the idea/expression dichotomy, fair use privilege, and limited term—
provide far weaker constraints on copyright holder prerogatives than
85
they did in 1970.” As a result, he argues, “First Amendment
challenges to copyright law warrant a far more rigorous analysis, and
that copyright’s speech-burdening effects should be subject to
considerably more exacting First Amendment scrutiny than courts
86
have accorded thus far.” He suggests that copyright law should be
subject to the “exacting scrutiny” the Supreme Court enunciated in
87
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.
In the 1994 Turner case, cable television operators challenged
the must-carry provisions of the Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 as an unconstitutional
88
violation of their First Amendment rights. The must-carry provisions
required cable systems to carry local commercial and noncommercial
89
television stations. The Court held that the Cable Act’s must-carry
rules were content-neutral because they were unrelated to the

82. Netanel, supra note 77, at 4.
83. Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of
Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1186-1204 (1970).
84. Netanel, supra note 77, at 8 (citing Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge
the First Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 11861204 (1970)). Lawrence Lessig, professor at Stanford Law School, notes that there are
“few essays in the field of legal science that have had as profound an impact on the law” as
Melville Nimmer’s UCLA Law Review, entitled ‘Does Copyright Abridge the First
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?,’ published more than thirty years
ago—“not just among academics, but among courts as well.” Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s
First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1059 (2001).
85. Netanel, supra note 77, at 12.
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 6. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662-64 (1994).
88. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 622 (1994).
89. See id. at 630. See also 47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(1) (2004).
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content of the cable operators’ programs.90 However, the Government
needed to show that the economic health of local broadcasting was in
genuine jeopardy and in need of the protections afforded by must91
carry provisions. The Court applied a content-neutral, intermediate
scrutiny to the regulation, but it added teeth to the test by requiring a
92
factual showing of economic necessity. In a later section of this
article, the economic jeopardy standard will be discussed again.
First Amendment analysis changes, depending on whether a
regulation is content-based or content-neutral. While Professor
Netanel classifies copyright law as content-neutral, rather than
93
content-based regulation, not all scholars agree. Professors Mark
Lemley and Eugene Volokh, from the University of Texas Law
School, argue that intellectual property rights, including copyright,
are a form of content-based, government-imposed speech restriction
that should not be exempt from conventional First Amendment
94
scrutiny. They posit that Congress’s power to create copyright, as
95
provided by the Constitution, does not “exempt copyright law from
96
all First Amendment scrutiny.” Since the purpose of the Bill of
Rights was to restrain the federal government’s exercise of its
enumerated powers, the professors reason that Congress is subject to
First Amendment constraints, and thus copyright law “must be bound
97
by the First Amendment too.”
B.

Media Specific First Amendment Analyses

Webcasters have First Amendment rights. Freedom of speech,
broadly conceived to include expressive conduct and symbolic speech,
also applies to music. The Court has noted that music is one of the
oldest forms of human expression and as a form of expression and
98
communication it is protected under the First Amendment. Because

90. Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 647.
91. Id. at 664- 65.
92. See Netanel, supra note 77, at 56-58.
93. See id. at 48.
94. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in
Intellectual Property, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165-69 (1998).
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, 8, cl. 8.
96. Lemley & Volokh, supra note 94, at 190.
97. Id. (noting that while the government has the enumerated power to run the post
office, it cannot refuse to carry communist propaganda, similarly the government has
power to regulate interstate commerce, but it cannot impose content-based restrictions on
the interstate distribution of newspapers).
98. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989).
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webcasters have First Amendment rights, the next question is what
level of protection the Web receives.
The Supreme Court applies different levels of First Amendment
protection to different forms of mass communication. The Court has
“long recognized that each medium of expression presents special
99
First Amendment problems.” As far back as 1949, Justice Jackson
acknowledged that “[t]he moving picture screen, the radio, the
newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner orator
have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers” and “[e]ach . . . is
100
a law unto itself.” And over time the Court has established different
standards for different media, including broadcast radio and
101
print,102 drive-in movie theatres,103 billboards,104
television,
105
telephone, cable television,106 and the Internet.107
1.

Print Media Model

First
Amendment
jurisprudence
erects
a
“virtually
insurmountable barrier” between the government and the print
media to regulate matters affecting the exercise of journalistic
108
judgment about what to print. Editorial choices and judgment of
what material to include in a publication is at the core of what the
First Amendment protects. In one of the most prominent newspaper
109
cases, the Supreme Court held Florida’s “right of reply” statute
unconstitutional because it violated the First Amendment’s guarantee
110
of a free press. The Court reasoned that compelling an editor or

99. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
100. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
101. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
102. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
103. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
104. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
105. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
106. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC,
520 U.S. 180 (1997).
107. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
108. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J.,
concurring). Justice White explained that the balance struck by the First Amendment is
important because “[a]ny other accommodation—any other system that would supplant
private control of the press with the heavy hand of government intrusion—would make
the government the censor of what the people may read and know.” Id. at 260.
109. See FLA. STAT. § 104.38 (1973). The statute provided that if a candidate’s
personal character or official record was attacked by a newspaper, the candidate had the
right to demand that the newspaper print, free of charge, any reply the candidate made to
the newspaper’s criticisms. Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 244.
110. Id.
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publisher to publish certain material was as repugnant as a state
111
command forbidding a newspaper to publish certain content. The
Court observed that “[a] responsible press is an undoubtedly
desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the
112
Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.”
Desirable goals are insufficient when a regulation fails First
Amendment scrutiny.
2.

Broadcasting Model

In 1969, the Court unambiguously stated, “[a]lthough
broadcasting is clearly a medium affected by a First Amendment
interest, differences in the characteristics of new media justify
113
differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.”
The Court distinguished broadcasting, which includes radio and
television, from print media, insofar as broadcasting uses spectrum, a
114
limited public resource.
Unlike a First Amendment right to free speech or freedom of the
press, the Court said “[n]o one has a First Amendment right to a
115
license or to monopolize a radio frequency.” Because of the scarcity
of radio frequencies, the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
116
broadcasters, is paramount. While recognizing that each medium of
expression presents special First Amendment problems, in 1978, the
Court explained that of all forms of communication, broadcasting,
117
“has received the most limited First Amendment protection.” The
Court reasoned that such restrictions on this form of communication
are justified because “the broadcast media have established a
uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans” and
“broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young
118
to read.” Restrictions that are permissible on broadcasters are not
necessarily permissible on other media that do not share similar
characteristics, such as spectrum scarcity or pervasiveness.
111. See id. at 256.
112. Id. at 256-58.
113. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (citation omitted).
114. Id. at 388 (noting “[w]here there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First
Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write,
or publish.”).
115. Id. at 389.
116. Id. at 390. Broadcasters are public trustees insofar as broadcast frequencies are
limited and, therefore, are “necessarily considered a public trust.” Id. at 400.
117. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
118. Id. at 748- 49.
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Internet Model

Regulating content on the Internet presents new issues for the
Court. In Reno v. ACLU, the Court stated that the material on the
119
Internet is “as diverse as human thought.” According to the Court,
the Internet is a new marketplace of ideas that has experienced and
120
continues to experience phenomenal growth and expansion. As
such, the Court presumed that government regulation of the content
of speech on the Internet was “more likely to interfere with the free
121
exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”
The uniqueness of the Internet as a new medium, where old rules
and old burdens may not necessarily apply, was emphasized in the
122
Ashcroft v. ACLU decision by three justices concurring in the
123
124
plurality decision, Justice O’Connor in a concurrence, and Justice
125
Stevens in the dissent. In the Court’s most recent pronouncement
regarding the Internet, Justices Kennedy, Souter and Ginsburg noted
that the jurisprudence of other media may be of limited utility for
Internet-based cases, because “[t]he economics and technology of
Internet communication differ in important ways from those of
126
Justice O’Connor agreed with Justice
telephones and mail.”
Kennedy that “given Internet speakers’ inability to control the
geographic location of their audience, expecting them to bear the
burden of controlling the recipients of their speech . . . may be
entirely too much to ask, and would potentially suppress an
127
inordinate amount of expression.” Justice Stevens was also struck
by the fact that “[t]he Internet presents a unique forum for
communication because information, once posted, is accessible
128
everywhere on the network at once.” In sum, five justices clearly
ascribe to the notion that the Internet is fundamentally different from

119. 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
120. See id. at 885. For a judicial exposition of the marketplace of ideas theory see
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“[T]he best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out.”).
121. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
122. 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
123. See id. at 591 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
124. See id. at 586 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
125. See id. at 602 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 595 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
127. Id. at 587 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
128. Id. at 605 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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other media and that brick-and-mortar rules should not be blindly
applied to the Web.
The print model is given heightened First Amendment
protection because of the editorial control and judgment exercised
129
over the content and the minimal barriers to entry into the market.
Webcasting may have an even stronger claim to First Amendment
protection of content, because the barriers to entry are so minimal:
those who can access material on the Web can also disseminate
material via the Web. This is a bright-line distinction between the
Internet, print, and broadcasting models. Many people may access
print, broadcasting, or cable outlets, but few people may disseminate
via these outlets. The barrier between being a speaker and a listener
130
on the Web is as permeable as a user wishes it to be.
What does this media-specific First Amendment analysis mean
for webcasters? It means that the Internet’s unique technological
features deserve broad protections to ensure that the full potential of
the medium is not retarded. It also means that the statutory license
restrictions, in the form of the sound recording complement placed on
webcasters, may be unconstitutional.

IV. Discussion
The level of scrutiny a court uses to review government
regulation often depends on the type of speech, such as whether it is
political, commercial, or obscene, and the type of regulation, such as
whether it is content-based or content-neutral. However, the Court
explained that “[d]eciding whether a particular regulation is content
131
based or content neutral is not always a simple task.” A court
reviewing the constitutionality of the sound recording complement

129. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
130. The Future of Music Coalition, a not-for-profit collaboration between members
of the music, technology, public policy, and intellectual property law communities,
highlights the value of Webcasting: “In this increasingly consolidated and concentrated
radio marketplace, webcasting represents an opportunity to break the bottleneck.”
Future of Music Coalition, Copyright Royalties: Where is the Right Spot on the
Dial for Webcasting?, FutureofMusic.org, at http://www.futureofmusic.org/news/
senatejudiciarywebcasting.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2004). The organization also identifies
three unique attributes of Webcasting. First, it offers the opportunity for programming
diversity. Second, it has low barriers to entry and to legitimate competition. And third,
Webcasting offers the global reach of the Internet. Id.
131. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001). The Court’s selection of a level of
scrutiny is often thought to be as determinative of the outcome of the case as any weighing
of particular interests. See MATTHEW D. BUNKER, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA:
RECONCILING FAIR TRIALS AND A FREE PRESS 31 (1997).
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would need to make the threshold determination about the nature of
the copyright regulation.
A. Sound Recording Complement as a Content-Based Restriction

If the regulation were content-based, then courts would apply a
more restrictive, strict scrutiny test. Content-based regulations control
speech because the government favors or disfavors the message.
Content-based regulation is subject to the most stringent First
Amendment test because courts are suspicious of viewpoint
restrictive regulations in a society that prizes intellectual freedom. To
prevail under a strict scrutiny analysis, the government must show
that its regulation is (1) necessary to serve a compelling state interest
132
and (2) is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. According to the
Court, “[r]egulations which permit the Government to discriminate
on the basis of the content of the message cannot be tolerated under
133
the First Amendment.”
Restricting the number of songs played within a three-hour
period could be deemed a content-based regulation. The restriction is
triggered by the identity of the artist. The restriction limits the
content that a webcaster may transmit because no more than three
songs by an artist can be played within a three-hour period. The three
songs per three-hour limitation may have a disproportionate effect on
niche markets because the number of artists within the genre may be
smaller. There may be a larger pool of songs and artists to choose
from in the mainstream genres, such as classic rock, as opposed to
niche or emerging genres. The songs and artists of traditional musical
styles are favored by this regulation because finding a sufficient
supply of songs to fill the three-hour playlist may not be a challenge.
However, less well-known or favored musical formats may struggle to
find enough songs and artists to complete a three-hour playlist before
a fourth song by an artist can be played.
A court could also find that the statutory license is content-based
because it, on its face, favors one media over another. The regulation
does not favor one webcaster over another; rather it favors traditional
broadcasters over webcasters where the barriers to entry are much

132. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd.,
502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991); Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231
(1987).
133. Regan v. Time, Inc. 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984).
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lower.134 The regulation favors one messenger over another. Favoring
broadcast stations by imposing an additional fee on Internet radio
135
stations amounts to imposing a special tax on Web radio.
Applying strict scrutiny a court may find that the sound
recording complement does not serve a compelling governmental
interest and is not narrowly tailored. There is no legislative record
indicating a governmental interest in limiting webcasters’ playlist
options based on the identity of the artist. The legislative history
evinces no compelling government interest; on the contrary, it
demonstrates a strong lobbying interest in the sound recording
complement. This regulation does not serve a compelling
governmental interest and it places a unique and overly intrusive
burden on a new medium.
The sound recording complement may also fail strict scrutiny
analysis because it is not narrowly tailored. The evil sought to be
avoided, namely lost profits, is not furthered by this regulation since
webcasters are obligated to pay a license fee. If webcasters pay both
music copyright holder’s license fees, then further restricting
webcasters’ playlist options to the point that it interferes with their
ability to satisfy consumer listening appetites and earn a profit
undermines the government purpose. If a webcaster cannot play as
many songs as she wants, then this interferes with the webcaster’s
ability to maintain user traffic to the site and thereby diminishing
136
advertisers interest in advertising on the Web site.
The sound recording complement impermissibly intrudes on the
editorial function of webcasters. Webcasters are unnecessarily
restricted in content of their transmissions. If a court applied a
content-based strict scrutiny analysis to the sound recording
complement it could be struck down as unconstitutional.
B.

Sound Recording Complement as a Content-Neutral Restriction

On the other hand, a court could find that the sound recording
complement embodied in the Copyright Act is content-neutral.
Content-neutral restrictions must be made without regard or
134. One could also, but I will not here, make an equal protection challenge on the
grounds that broadcasters and webcasters are treated dissimilarly and that the
fundamental right of freedom of expression is at issue. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
135. See Rob Pegoraro, They’re Not Treating Webcasters Like Royalty, WASHINGTON
POST, May 26, 2002, at H05. See also Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221, 234 (1987) (finding that a discriminatory tax impinges on the First Amendment).
136. A substantive due process argument is beyond the scope of this article. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV § 1.

2004]

PLAY IT AGAIN, SAM

339

“reference to the content of the regulated speech.”137 According to the
Court, “laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech
without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most
138
instances content-neutral.” A prohibition, such as restrictions on
sound trucks from emitting loud and raucous noise in residential
neighborhoods, is permissible according to the Court, “if it applies
139
equally to music, political speech, and advertising.” The sound
recording complement applies equally to all artists and all genre of
music; classical jazz is treated no differently from heavy metal.
Therefore, a court may apply a content-neutral, intermediate
scrutiny.
Content-neutral regulations are analyzed under a three-part test
140
established by United States v. O’Brien. The government must show
that (1) the regulation “furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest,” (2) “the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression,” and (3) the “incidental restriction
on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential
141
to the furtherance of that interest.” The Court also instructed, “[a]
statute is narrowly tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than
142
the exact source of the ‘evil’ it seeks to remedy.” There must also be
ample alternative channels available for communicating the
143
information.
In applying intermediate scrutiny, a court may find that the
statutory history of the copyright acts lack any evidence that the
economic health of copyright owners of sound recordings were in
genuine jeopardy and in need of the protections afforded by the
statutory license and royalty fee. The Court applied this level contentneutral, intermediate scrutiny to the must-carry regulations of cable
144
operators in the 1994 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC case.
This content-neutral test has teeth since it requires a factual showing
of economic necessity on behalf of those benefited by the
145
regulation. A court is likely to find that there is no economic
137. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993) (citing
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
138. Turner Broad, Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).
139. City of Cincinnati, 507 U.S. at 428 (citing Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).
140. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791
(1989) and Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
141. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376- 77 (1968).
142. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
143. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989).
144. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664-65 (1994).
145. See Netanel, supra note 77, at 56-58.
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evidence that limiting the sound recording complement to three songs
per three hours benefits the recipients of sound recording fees, i.e.,
146
the record labels.
Digital streams of compressed audio over the Web are not as
147
good as original CD quality. And since streaming is not a “perfect
148
copy,” not like peer-to-peer file sharing, a court may find that
149
webcasting is unlikely to take away from record company sales. So
long as the artist is compensated by the royalty fee, and the webcast
does not directly compete with the sales of original recordings, the
government has no substantial interest in limiting a webcasters First
Amendment right to free speech through music.
The statutory license’s restrictive sound recording complement
places an unacceptably heavy burden on protected speech in light of
the fact that copyright owners of both sound recording and musical
compositions are compensated under the new royalty provisions in
the Copyright Act. The sound recording complement effectively
suppresses a large amount of speech, in the form of music, which
listeners have a constitutional right to receive as expressive
communication. The restriction on this speech is unacceptable
because the government does not have a substantial interest in
restricting webcasters’ expression.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to grant copyrights and
patents in order “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
150
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” The
Court has explained that “[t]he economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
146. While record companies may point to a slump in CD sales, it is not clear that
accessing music online is to blame. See Jim Hu, Music Sales Dip; Net Seen as Culprit,
CNET NEWS.COM, April 16, 2002, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-883761.html?tag=rn.
John Borland, a staff writer for CNET, points to a May 2002 study in which roughly 34
percent of veteran file swappers reported spending more on music than they had before
they started downloading files, whereas roughly 14 percent of heavy file traders said they
now spent less on music. See John Borland, Study: File Sharing Boosts Music Sales, CNET
NEWS.COM, May 3, 2002, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-898813.html.
147. See Katharine Mieszkowski, Web Radio’s Last Stand, SALON.COM, March 26,
2002, at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/03/26/web_radio/index.html.
148. See R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing
Law, Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237 (2001) (discussing
copyright owner’s concerns of file sharing and possible solutions).
149. See Mieszkowski, supra note 147. Rusty Hodge, the general manager of the
Internet-only radio station SomaFM explains that Webcasting, which uses compressed
audio files, is different from peer-to-peer file sharing and should be treated the same a
terrestrial broadcasting. Id.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is
the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors
151
and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’” A court may find that
there is no reasonable fit between the goal of creating new works of
authorship and restricting the number of songs that a webcaster can
play during a three-hour period.
The heightened level of scrutiny that demands a showing of
economic need is appropriate because webcasters’ unique
152
characteristics of the medium deserve heightened protection. The
barriers of entry are lower for webcasters than they are for traditional
terrestrial broadcasters. Unlike the FCC’s regulation of the broadcast
industry, no federal agency licenses webcasters. Additionally, little
more is needed to webcast music than to listen to it, unlike the
asymmetry between a radio station broadcaster and an owner of a
radio.
Furthermore, a webcaster’s audience is global, rather than tied to
the local area served by an over-the-air radio station. Consequently,
webcasters can play to the niche audiences, rather than appealing to
153
the average listener in the local area. According to Jefferson
Graham, a USA Today writer, “[u]nlike broadcast stations, which
have tight playlists, the new medium of Net radio airs a greater
variety of music and has become popular with fans of world music,
bluegrass, jazz, blues, independent and alternative rock, and other
154
genres rarely heard on radio.”
On a global scale there may be enough listeners for advertisers to
support an array of formats. For terrestrial broadcasters, on the other
151. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
152. See Thomas C. Vinje, et al., Collecting Society Practices Retard Development of
Online Music Market: A European Perspective, 20 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER 14
(2003). The authors observe:
The Internet allows both established providers of online music and new market
entrants to deliver novel competitive music offerings that are better tailored to
the users’ individual music desires than those available through traditional music
distribution channels. Online music delivery also brings significant cost
reductions and other economic efficiencies and significantly decreases
geographical barriers to music distribution. The availability of more music at
lower cost than ever would not be possible within the constraints of traditional
music dissemination channels (e.g., FM radio and record shops) and also benefits
consumers.
Id.
153. For example, SomaFM, based in San Francisco, offers an alternative to the
mainstream, offline fare, with streams of ambient down-tempo electronica to about 20,000
listeners a day. See Mieszkowski, supra note 147.
154. Jefferson Graham, Mourning the End of Small Net Radio Sites, USA TODAY,
July 22, 2002, at 4D.
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hand, if there are not enough listeners in the local area, then the will
not be sufficient advertising revenue to support the niche format.
Terrestrial broadcasters must appeal to the lowest common
denominator in the local area to generate enough advertising
revenue. However, webcasters are not constrained by local audience
predilections, therefore they may target the smaller niche markets on
a global scale.
The sound recording complement may also fail intermediate
scrutiny since ample alternative channels for communicating the
music are unavailable. If a small webcaster does not qualify for the
statutory license, there is no viable alternative for obtaining copyright
permission at a reasonable price. It may be too onerous and
burdensome to negotiate permission and price with sound recording
copyright owners to broadcast songs, therefore this may not a realistic
alternative for webcasters.
A reoccurring mantra in First Amendment jurisprudence is that
the government regulations should not burden speech more than
155
necessary. However, this copyright regulation threatens to squeeze
156
small businesses and niche voices out of the marketplace. The Court
has noted, “[g]overnmental restraint on publishing need not fall into
familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional
157
limitations on governmental powers.” The Court has also stated,
“[a] licensing system need not effect total suppression in order to

155. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
156. Internet Radio does not offer only music, it also offers a vehicle for the
disenfranchised to communicate to the world. See, e.g., Don Rojas, Keeping Diversity in
the Media, 33 ESSENCE 146, 146 (2002).
As Black media professionals struggle to build a strong presence within the
mainstream, let us embrace the opportunities and potential of new information
technology and the Internet to nourish Black opinion and vision. Let’s use the
Internet to project our independent, fearless voices to the world. With its
inherent interactivity, new media can empower Black communities throughout
the country in a way that traditional media cannot. Let’s take the Gil Nobles and
put them on the Internet so that the world can hear their voices.
This is part of the legacy that our ancestors bestowed on us: Whenever
established forums have shut out our message, we have found other ways to
communicate—be it with drums, coded songs or the imagery in quilts or from the
pulpit. Internet radio may be our twenty-first century equivalent.
Id.
157. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 (1974) (citing Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244- 45 (1936)).
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create a prior restraint.”158 The sound recording performance
complement limitations for qualifying for a statutory license
webcasters do not completely ban the streaming of an entire hour
filled with songs by a single artist. However, the burden on the
webcaster to negotiate price and permission has the effect of an
unconstitutional restraint on freedom of expression.
159
The marketplace of ideas needs good music, not corporate
160
music. For example, Adam Baer, a writer for the New York Sun,
observes, “Webcasting opera would help the genre reach a young,
161
global audience in a way radio never could.” For the marketplace of
ideas in music to flourish, the new medium of webcasting should be
given wide protection. In Reno v. ACLU, the Court recently
explained that “[a]s a matter of constitutional tradition, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that governmental
regulation of the content of speech is more likely to interfere with the
free exchange of ideas than to encourage it. The interest in
encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs
162
any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship.” The First
Amendment should protect webcasters’ freedom of expression in the
form of musical preferences and playlists without unnecessary
restrictions.

V. Conclusion
So what does this mean for Becca, the aspiring webcaster? Until
the sound recording complement, which restricts the number of songs
by an artist that can be played in a three hour period, is successfully

158. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 n.8 (1975). The Court
explained, “the evils attendant on prior restraint ‘are not rendered less objectionable
because the regulation of expression is one of classification rather than direct
suppression.’” Id.
159. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes introduced the marketplace
doctrine into U.S. jurisprudence when he noted, “[T]he best test of truth is the power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.” Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
160. Because of the new royalty scheme and accompanying restrictions “[t]he only
[companies] who’ll be able to continue are the conglomerates. For the consumer, that
means less choice and (less) exposure to new acts. It’s bad for consumers, bad for artists
and bad for the labels,” according to Peter Csathy, president of media software company
MusicMatch, which runs the subscription RadioMX service. Graham, supra note 154. If
webcasters are not allowed to flourish, Web radio may “walk the same dreary path of
corporate consolidation as commercial FM.” See Pegoraro, supra note 135.
161. Adam Baer, Opera to the People, N.Y. SUN, Dec. 30, 2003, at 16.
162. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
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challenged in a court or repealed by Congress it will unduly restrict
her First Amendment right to free expression. The full advantages of
this new medium to target and appeal to minority interests will
continue to be limited until the sound recording complement is
eliminated. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the First
Amendment “rests on the assumption that the widest possible
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
163
essential to the welfare of the public.” While the Court was
speaking of newspapers, this protected right of dissemination should
be no less true for webcasters.

163. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).

